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Abstract
A different approach towards quantum theory is proposed in this paper. The
basis is taken to be conceptual variables, physical variables that may be accessible
or inaccessible, i.e., it may be possible or impossible to assign numerical values
to them. In an epistemic process, the accessible variables are just ideal observa-
tions as observed by an actor or by some communicating actors. Group actions
are defined on these variables, and using group representation theory this is the
basis for developing the Hilbert space formalism here. Operators corresponding
to accessible conceptual variables are derived as a result of the formalism, and in
the discrete case it is argued that the possible physical values are the eigenvalues
of these operators. The Born formula is derived under specific assumptions. The
whole discussion here is a supplement to the author’s book [1]. The interpretation
of quantum states (or eigenvector spaces) implied by this approach is as focused
questions to nature together with sharp answers to those questions. Resolutions if
the identity are then connected to the questions themselves; these may be comple-
mentary in the sense defined by Bohr. This interpretation may be called a general
epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. It is similar to Zwirn’s recent Convival
Solipsism, and also to QBism, and more generally, can be seen as a concrete imple-
mentation of Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics. The focus in the present
paper is, however, as much on foundation as on interpretation. But the simple con-
sequences of an epistemic interpretation for some so called quantum paradoxes
are discussed. Connections to statistical inference theory are discussed in a pre-
liminary way, both through an example and through a brief discussion of quantum
measurement theory.
1 Introduction
One purpose of this article is to pave the way towards discussing possible connections
between quantum foundation and aspects of the foundation of statistical inference the-
ory. The final goal is to find links between these two scientific areas, but also to point
at differences. For this we need a common language, here expressed by conceptual
variables, physical variables attached to some agent. Another purpose of the article is
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to give an introduction to the approach towards formal quantum theory through such
variables. During these developments, I will discuss essential aspects both of the foun-
dation of quantum theory and of the interpretation of the theory.
For the quantum theory discussion, take as a point of departure the famous Bell
experiment, discussed by many authors; here I rely mainly on the discussion in Gill
[2].
Alice and Bob have a space-like separation and thus cannot communicate. They
each measure the spin component of a particle from an entangled pair. The measure-
ment θ made by Alice is what I call a conceptual variable, attached to her. Similarly,
Bob has a measurement, his conceptual variable ψ . It is crucial for me that there do
exist experiments where one has to attach a conceptual variable to an observer.
To define these conceptual variables, I will think of ideal experiments. In my opin-
ion, for non-ideal, imperfect measurement apparata, one should use statistical model-
ing. For this reason and for several other reasons I include a section on the foundation
of statistical inference in this paper.
Now each of Alice and Bob has a free will, and they choose some setting for their
measurement. The hypothetical (perfect) measurement results A or A′ for Alice, given
her settings a or a′, and for Bob, the hypothetical measurements B and B′, given his
settings b or b′ are the background for one of Bell’s inequalities, the CHSH inequality:
E(AB)+E(AB′)+E(A′B)−E(A′B′)≤ 2, (1)
which can be found formally by taking expectations term by term in the inequality
AB+AB′+A′B−A′B′ ≤ 2, (2)
an inequality which is easily proved by just assuming the all the variables take the value
+1 or -1.
It is now known that the inequality (1) can be violated both by Nature and by
quantum mechanics.
My explanation for this is as follows: The four possible outcomes with specified
settings A,A′,B,B′ constitute a set of four numbers that cannot all be observed by Alice
nor by Bob during measurements and hence not by any observer. I will insist that
such a set of variables is meaningless, in the sense that no theory made by humans
should be able to describe this set of variables. This includes quantum mechanics
and any potential theory that could be thought of to replace quantum mechanics. Any
theory should concentrate on the (ideal) measurements made by Alice and Bob, each
attached to one observer and to what is known to this observer: Her or his settings a/a′,
respectively b/b′ and the resulting measurement, x for Alice (ideal variable θ ) and y
for Bob (ideal variable ψ).
I will generalize this to: For any allowable variable in any possible (quantum-like)
theory one should be permitted to think of this variable as included in an experiment
where the variable is exclusively attached to a particular observer. Only if the actual
experiment is such that all real and imagined observers agree on some observation, this
observation result may be seen as a property of the real world.
As is well known, several loophole-free Bell experiments have been performed
during recent years. (For a discussion of loopholes; see Larsson [3]; the experiments
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are described in [4, 5].) To describe such experiments, it is in my opinion natural to use
statistical language. As suggested by Richard Gill, I use the word ‘trial’ for the choices
of one setting each by Alice and Bob and the observation of one binary outcome by
each, and I use the word ‘run’ for a sequence of trials. During a run, settings are
typically chosen anew, again and again, by some random mechanism. At the end of
the run, Alice and Bob come together and then together have a large number N of
quadruples: setting Alice, outcome Alice, setting Bob, outcome Bob. Note that these
are data, and must be modeled by some statistical model.
Look first at Alice’s data and the model of these. The settings, although random,
can also be thought of as chosen by Alice. Thus it is natural to have in the model a
variable z, indicating the contribution to the setting by Alice. In statistical language
this variable must be ancillary, that is, have a distribution that is independent of any
parameter. By the conditionality principle of statistics, see for instance [1], every in-
ference should be conditional, given z. Similarly, Bob has his model and his z to be
conditioned on. This gives two separate statistical inferences, one for Alice and one
for Bob. The four estimates of mean outcomes: for Alice with settings a and a′ and for
Bob with settings b and b′ are then the results of two different models and may well
violate the CHSH inequality. Note that these are estimates from two separate sets of
data, and there is no need to talk about any corresponding ‘real’ vector consisting of 4
hypothetical perfect outcomes.
It is often said that the Bell theorem shows that quantum theory must violate either
reality, locality or no-conspiracy. It may be inferred from these recent experiments that
Nature also must violate either reality, locality or no-conspiracy. I do not want to drop
locality, simply for the reason that I believe in relativity theory. In fact it seems that
reality is violated in the sense that there exist certain ‘real’ quantities that we are not
allowed to talk about in any human-made theory. In the physical literature different
concepts describing attitudes to the Bell experiment are introduced. For instance, in
the language of Schmelzer [6], the attitude to rely on conditioning in the way that I
have advocated, is related to superdeterminism, a concept which is further discussed in
[7].
We must always hold open the possibility that a physical variable has to be con-
nected to a particular observer. This is an important point of departure for me.This also
implies that the quantum state of a given physical system may depend on the observer.
In this article, as in [1] and [8], a conceptual variable is defined as any variable
attached to a person or by a group of communicating persons. A conceptual variable
is called accessible if it, through an experiment or in other ways, is possible to assign
numerical values to it; otherwise it is called inaccessible. For example, by Heisen-
berg’s inequality the vector (position, momentum) for a particle is inaccessible. These
notions are particularly interesting in the case of an epistemic process, a process to
achieve knowledge. Epistemic processes are discussed in detail in [1]. Two basic such
processes are statistical experiments and quantum measurements, but there are also
other types of epistemic processes.
Going back to the Bell situation, the vector of four hypothetical ideal spin measure-
ments is inaccessible, but in a very strong sense: The recent loophole-free experiments
have indicated that even Nature does not permit any discussion of any consequences of
regarding this vector as a realistic variable.
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As will be thoroughly discussed below, the point of departure sketched here to-
gether with symmetry assumptions has implications both for the foundation for and the
interpretation of quantum theory. First, it implies under certain conditions the Hilbert
space formulation, including introductions of operators for accessible variables and
state vectors. Secondly it makes the following interpretation natural: State vectors, or
more generally eigenvector spaces of operators, are in correspondence with focused
questions to nature together with sharp answers to these questions. Arguments for
this interpretation are discussed more fully in Section 7 below. For brevity, except
for this introductory discussion of the Bell inequality, entanglement will not be further
discussed in this paper.
Taking this loosely defined notion of conceptual variables as a basis, and then post-
poning the problem of making this notion concrete, allows us largely to stay agnostic
concerning some of the debates on the interpretation of quantum theory and the debates
between the different schools in statistical inference theory. However, the epistemic
view in quantum theory turns out to be necessary, and an ideal observer may act as
some kind of Bayesian in this theory.
The interpretation proposed here, is in fact similar to Hervé Zwirn’s recent Convival
Solipsism, see [9] and references there. In the latter paper, a more detailed discussion of
the EPR paradox and the Bell inequalities is given. Comparisons with Everett’s many
world interpretations and variants of this are thoroughly discussed. Convival Solipsism
allows quantum mechanics to be local even if it is at the price of reinterpreting the
formalism in a rather radical way. I agree that such a reinterpretation has to be made.
Zwirn argues that no satisfying solution can avoid mentioning the observer as playing
a major role in the measurement. I completely agree with this.
To go a little more in detail, Convival Solipsism states that the physical world dy-
namics is entirely driven by the linear, deterministic dynamics of the Scrödinger equa-
tion and nothing else. But it is assumed that our brain is not equipped to make us aware
of all the subtleties of the superposed state, to perceive the universe in all its subtleties.
In particular, Zwirn makes two assumptions: 1) The relative state assumption: Any
state vector is relative to a given conscious observer and cannot be considered in an
absolute way. 2) The hanging-on mechanism: A measurement is the awareness of a
result by a concious observer whose consciousness selects at random (according to the
Born rule) one branch of the entangled state vector written in the preferred basis and
hangs-on to it.
Except for the point that I rather would have used the word ‘focusing’ instead of
‘awareness’, this interpretation seems to fit rather perfectly into my own views. Even
so, I will in this article prefer to stay more agnostic regarding interpretations, except
that I have a general epistemic view. If necessary, this view may be seen as a concrete
specification of Rovelli’s general Relational Quantum Mechanics [10] or of the more
information-related views advocated for instance in [11].
Zwirn states also that the Born rule is not problematic by itself but the conditions
of its use may be unclear. Again I agree. For my own derivation of the Born rule and
other derivations, see Section 9 below.
In Sections 4-9 of this paper I concentrate on the derivation of the quantum for-
malism. It is crucial in this context that I assume that there are defined transformation
groups on the spaces of conceptual variables that are discussed. This may be the group
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of all automorphisms on the space in which the conceptual variable varies, or it may be
a concrete subgroup of this group.
In this paper I discuss such situations more closely with a focus on the more mathe-
matical aspects of the notions and situations described above. I assume the existence of
a concrete (physical) situation, and that there is a space ΩΦ of an inaccessible concep-
tual variable φ with a groupK acting on this space. There is an e-variable, an accessible
conceptual variable, θ defined, a function on ΩΦ. This θ varies on a space ΩΘ, and the
group K may induce a transformation group G on ΩΘ.
A very simple situation is when φ is a spin vector, and θ is a spin component in a
given direction, but this paper focuses on more general situations. Also, in the simple
spin situation the natural groupK for the spin vector does not directly induce groups on
the components, so one must seek special solutions for this case; see a brief discussion
in Section 6 below.
When there are several potential accessible variables, I will denote this by a super-
script a: θ a and Ga = {ga}. Note that in Chapter 4 of [1] I used different notations
for the groups: G and G˜a for what is here called K and Ga. The group Ga which was
refered to there, is here the subgroup of K corresponding to Ga, denoted by Ha below.
Both here and in [1] I will use the word ‘group’ as synonymous to ‘group action’ or
transformation group on some set, not as an abstract group.
The article has some overlap with the paper [8], but the perspective here is wider.
To avoid misunderstandings, I do not claim that my derivations should compete
with the deep investigations recently on deriving the Hilbert space structure from phys-
ical assumptions [12, 13,14,15,16]. By using group representation theory, I assume in a
sense some Hilbert space structure. As is stated in [17] though, there is a problem con-
necting the above general derivations to the many different interpretations of quantum
theory. By contrast, the derivation presented here is tied to a particular interpretation:
A general epistemic interpretation. This is also elaborated on in [1].
Group representation theory in discussing quantum foundation has also been used
other places; see for instance [18]. In quantum field theory and particle physics theory,
the use of group representation theory is crucial [19].
Section 2 gives some background. In Section 3 I introduce some basic group theory
that is needed in the paper. Then in Sections 4-9 I formulate my approach to the foun-
dation of quantum theory. The basis is conceptual variables with group actions defined
on them. From this, the ordinary quantum formalism is developed, and it is shown how
operators corresponding to accessible physical variables may be derived. The Born for-
mula is derived by using three assumptions: 1) A focused likelihood principle, derived
in [1] from the ordinary likelihood principle of statistics; 2) An assumption that the ac-
tual agent has ideals which can be modeled by a perfectly rational ideal agent; 3) The
assumption that the initial state may be connected to a maximally accessible variable.
In Section 10 various approaches to ordinary statistical inference are discussed, and in
Section 11 an example is given which lies in the border area between quantum theory
and Bayesian statistical inference. Section 12 discusses briefly quantum measurement
theory, while a final discussion is given in Sections 13-15.
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2 Some quantum theory and more discussions on inter-
pretation
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the ordinary quantum theory for discrete
observables: For each physical system there is a Hilbert space H , and each observable
θ on the system is associated with a self-adjoint operator A. The possible values of θ
are the eigenvalues of A. The states of the system are the unit vectors |u〉 of H , and
when |u〉 is an eigenvector of A corresponding to an eigenvalue uk, then θ = uk with
certainty. If necessary, the minimum amount of theory is for instance given in [20].
The purpose of the paper [8] has been to rederive essential elements of this formal
theory from assumptions about conceptual variables. On the following sections a part
of the discussion of [8] is included for completeness.
As is well known, the probabilities of quantum theory are calculated by the Born
rule. One version of this rule is: Assume that the physical system has been prepared in
the state |u〉, corresponding to θ a = uk for some observable θ a, and let the aim be to
measure another observable θ b. Then
P(θ b = v j) = 〈u|Π j|u〉, (3)
where Π j is the projector upon the eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue θ b = v j.
The Born rule is derived from a reasonable set of assumptions in [1]; see a discussion
in Section 9 below.
The reader is also probably aware of the fact that there exist several interpretations
of quantum theory, and that the discussions between the supporters of the different in-
terpretations is still going on. During the recent years there has been held a long range
of international conferences on the foundation of quantum mechanics. A great number
of interpretations have been proposed; some of them look very peculiar to the laymen.
For instance, the many worlds interpretation assumes that there exist millions or bil-
lions of parallel worlds, and that a new world appears every time when one performs a
measurement.
On two of these conferences recently there was taken an opinion poll among the
participants [21, 22]. It turned out to be an astonishing disagreement on many fun-
damental and fairly simple questions. One of these questions was: Is the quantum
mechanics a description of the objective world, or is it only a description of how we
obtain knowledge about reality? The first of these descriptions is called ontological, the
second epistemic. Up to now most physicists have supported the ontological or real-
istic interpretation of quantum mechanics, but versions of the epistemic interpretation
have received a fresh impetus during the recent years.
I look upon my book ’Epistemic Processes’ [1] as a contribution to this debate. An
epistemic process can denote any process to achieve knowledge. It can be a statistical
investigation or a quantum mechanical measurement, but it can also be a simpler pro-
cess. The book starts with an informal interpretation of quantum states, which in the
traditional theory has a very abstract definition. In my opinion, a quantum state can
under wide circumstances be connected to a focused question and a sharp answer to
this question.
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A related interpretation is QBism, or quantum Bayesianism, see Fuchs [23, 24,
25] and von Baeyer [26]. The predictions of quantum mechanics involve probabilities,
and a QBist interpret these as purely subjective probabilities, attached to a concrete
observer. Many elements in QBism represent something completely new in relation
to classical physical theory, in relation to many people’s conception about science in
general and also to earlier interpretations of quantummechanics. The essential thing is
that the observer plays a role that can not be eliminated. The single person’s compre-
hension of reality can differ from person to person, at least at a given point of time, and
this is in principle all that can be said.
Such an understanding can in my opinion be made valid for very many aspects of
reality. We humans can have a tendency to experience reality differently. Partly, this
can be explained by the fact that we give different meaning to the concepts we use. Or
we can have different contexts for our choices. An important aspect is that we focus
differently.
Hervé Zwirn’s views on QBism, which I largely agree with, are given in [27].
The statement that the state of a physical system may be connected an observer (or
a group of communicating observers), is discussed in the Introduction above.
By using group theory and group representation theory, I aim at studying a situation
involving conceptual variables mathematically, and it seems to appear that an essential
part of the quantum formulation can be derived under very weak conditions. My opin-
ion is that what we can develop from such results can be crucial for our views on the
world around us. Empirically, the quantum formalism has turned out to give a very ex-
tensive description of our world as we know it, in physical situations in microcosmos
an all-embracing description.
In decision situations and in cognitive modeling it has also been fruitful to look at
a quantum description, see [28, 29]. In a decision situation the decision variable may
be so extensive that it is impossible for the person in question to make a decision; this
variable is then called inaccessible. The person can then focus on a simpler, accessible,
decision variable, in such a way that it is possible to make a partial decision.
Sometimes it can be necessary to have an epistemic way to relate to the world; it
can simply be useful to seek knowledge. We can get knowledge on certain issues by
focusing on certain questions to the world around us, and our knowledge depends on
the answers we obtain to these questions. And this is all we can achieve.
Following such an opinion, it can be argued that for certain phenomena there exists
no other state concept than this (subjective) attached to each single person. This state-
ment must be made precise to be understood in the correct way. First, it is connected
to an ideal observer. Secondly, groups of observers that communicate, can go in and
act as one observer when a concrete measurement is focused on. When all potential
observers agree on the answer to a measurement, there is a strong indication that this
measurement represents an objective property of reality. Thus the objective world ex-
ists; it is the state attached to certain aspects of the world that in certain cases must be
connected to an observer (or to several communicating observers).
Nevertheless, these are aspects of physics – and science – which can be surprising
for many people, but in my opinion such viewpoints may be necessary, not only in
physics, but also in many other contexts.
Here is one remark concerning QBism, which can be said to represent a variant of
7
this view: Subjective Bayes-probabilities have also been in fashion among groups of
statisticians. In my opinion it can be very fruitful to look for analogies between statis-
tical inference theory and quantum mechanics, but then one must look more broadly
upon statistics and statistical inference theory, not only focus on subjective Bayesian-
ism. This is only one of several philosophies that can form a basis for statistics as a
science. Studying connections between these philosophies, is an active research area
today; some results are given in Section 10 below. From this discussion one might in-
fer that an interesting version of Bayesianism is an objective Bayesianism, with a prior
based on group actions.
3 Variables and group actions
Let φ be an inaccessible conceptual variable varying in a space ΩΦ. It is a basic phi-
losophy of the present paper that I always regard groups as group actions or transfor-
mations, acting on some space.
Starting with ΩΦ and a group K acting on ΩΦ, let θ (·) be an accessible function on
ΩΦ, and let ΩΘ be the range of this function.
As mentioned in the Introduction, I regard ‘accessible’ and ‘inaccessible’ as prim-
itive notions. ΩΘ and ΩΦ are equipped with topologies, and all functions are assumed
to be Borel-measurable.
Definition 1. The variable θ is maximally accessible if the following holds: If
θ can be written as θ = f (ψ) for a function f that is not bijective, the conceptual
variable ψ is not accessible. In other words: θ is maximal under the partial ordering
defined by α ≤ β iff α = f (β ) for some function f .
Note that this partial ordering is consistent with accessibility: If β is accessible and
α = f (β ), then α is accessible. Also, φ is an upper bound under this partial ordering.
The existence of maximally accessible conceptual variables follows then from Zorn’s
lemma.
Definition 2. The accessible variable θ is called permissible if the following holds:
θ (φ1) = θ (φ2) implies θ (kφ1) = θ (kφ2) for all k ∈ K.
With respect to parameters and subparameters along with their estimation, the con-
cept of permissibility is discussed in some details in Chapter 3 in [30]. The main con-
clusion, which also is valid in this setting, is that under the assumption of permissibility
one can define a group G of actions on ΩΘ such that
(gθ )(φ) := θ (kφ); k ∈ K. (4)
Herein I use different notations for the group actions g on ΩΘ and the group actions
k on ΩΦ; in contrast, the same symbol g was used in [30]. The background for that is
Lemma 1. Assume that θ is a permissible variable. The function from K to G
defined by (4) is then a group homomorphism.
8
Proof. Let ki be mapped upon gi by (4) for i= 1,2. Then, for all φ ∈ ΩΦ we have
(giθ )(φ) = θ (kiφ). Assume that k2φ is mapped to θ ′ = θ (k2φ) = (g2θ )(φ). Then also
θ (k1k2φ) = (g1θ )(k2φ) = (gθ )(φ) for some g. Thus (g1(g2θ ))(φ) = (gθ )(φ) for all
φ , and since the mapping is permissible, we must have g= g1g2.
It is important to define left and right invariant measures, both on the groups and
on the spaces of conceptual variables. In the mathematical literature, see for instance
[31, 32], Haar measures on the groups are defined (assuming locally compact groups).
Right (µG) and left (νG) Haar measures on the group G satisfy
µG(Dg) = µG(D), and νG(gD) = νK(D)
for g ∈ G and D⊂ G, respectively.
Next define the corresponding measures on ΩΘ. As is commonly done, I assume
that the group operations (g1,g2) 7→ g1g2, (g1,g2) 7→ g2g1 and g 7→ g−1 are continuous.
Furthermore, I will assume that the action (g,θ ) 7→ gθ is continuous.
As discussed in Wijsman [33], an additional condition is that every inverse image
of compact sets under the function (g,θ ) 7→ (gθ ,θ ) should be compact. A continuous
action by a group G on a space ΩΘ satisfying this condition is called proper. This
technical condition turns out to have useful properties and is assumed throughout this
paper. When the group action is proper, the orbits of the group can be proved to be
closed sets relative to the topology of ΩΘ.
The following result, originally due to Weil is proved in [33]; for more details on
the right-invariant case, see also [30].
Theorem 1. The left-invariant measure measure ν on ΩΘ exists if the action of G
on ΩΘ is proper and the group is locally compact.
The connection between νG defined on G and the corresponding left invariant mea-
sure ν defined on ΩΘ is relatively simple: If for some fixed value θ0 of the conceptual
variable the function β on G is defined by β : g 7→ gθ0, then ν(E) = νG(β−1(E)).This
connection between νG and ν can also be written νG(dg)= dν(gθ0)), so that dν(hgφ0)=
dν(gφ0) for all h,g ∈G.
Note that ν can be seen as an induced measure on each orbit of G on ΩΘ, and it
can be arbitrarily normalized on each orbit. ν is finite on a given orbit if and only if the
orbit is compact. In particular, ν can be defined as a probability measure on ΩΘ if and
only if all orbits of ΩΘ are compact. Furthermore, ν is unique only if the group action
is transitive.
In a corresponding fashion, a right invariant measure can be defined on ΩΘ. This
measure satisfies dµ(ghφ0) = dµ(gφ0) for all g,h∈G. In many cases the left invariant
measure and the right invariant measure are equal.
4 Operators and quantization
In the quantum-mechanical context defined in [1], θ is an accessible variable, and one
should be able to introduce an operator associated with θ . The following discussion
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which is partly inspired by [34]. considers an irreducible unitary representation of G
on a complex Hilbert space H .
4.1 A brief discussion of group representation theory
A group representation of G is a continuous homomorphism from G to the group of
invertible linear operatorsV on some vector space H :
V (g1g2) =V (g1)V (g2). (5)
It is also required that V (e) = I, where I is the identity, and e is the unit element of G.
This assures that the inverse exists: V (g)−1 =V (g−1). The representation is unitary if
the operators are unitary (V (g)†V (g) = I). If the vector space is finite-dimensional, we
have a representation D(V ) on the square, invertible matrices. For any representation
V and any fixed invertible operatorU on the vector space, we can define a new equiv-
alent representation asW (g) =UV (g)U−1. One can prove that two equivalent unitary
representations are unitarily equivalent; thusU can be chosen as a unitary operator.
A subspace H1 of H is called invariant with respect to the representation V if
u ∈H1 impliesV (g)u ∈H1 for all g ∈G. The null-space {0} and the whole space H
are trivially invariant; other invariant subspaces are called proper. A group representa-
tionV of a group G in H is called irreducible if it has no proper invariant subspace. A
representation is said to be fully reducible if it can be expressed as a direct sum of irre-
ducible subrepresentations. A finite-dimensional unitary representation of any group is
fully reducible. In terms of a matrix representation, this means that we can always find
aW (g) =UV(g)U−1 such that D(W ) is of minimal block diagonal form. Each one of
these blocks represents an irreducible representation, and they are all one-dimensional
if and only if G is Abelian. The blocks may be seen as operators on subspaces of
the original vector space, i.e., the irreducible subspaces. The blocks are important in
studying the structure of the group.
A useful result is Schur’s Lemma:
Let V1 and V2 be two irreducible representations of a group G; V1 on the space H1
and V2 on the space H2. Suppose that there exists a linear map T from H1 to H2 such
that
V2(g)T (v) = T (V1(g)v) (6)
for all g ∈ G and v ∈H1.
Then either T is zero or it is a linear isomorphism. Furthermore, if H1 =H2, then
T = λ I for some complex number λ .
Let ν be the left-invariant measure of the space ΩΘ induced by the group G, and
consider in this connection the Hilbert space H = L2(ΩΘ,ν). Then the left-regular
representation of G on H is defined by UL(g) f (φ) = f (g−1φ). This representation
always exists, and it can be shown to be unitary, see [34].
If V is an arbitrary representation of a compact group G in some Hilbert space H ,
then there exists in H a new scalar product defining a norm equivalent to the initial
one, relative to which V is a unitary representation of G.
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For references to some of the vast literature on group representation theory, see
Appendix A.2.4 in [30].
4.2 A resolution of the identity
In the following I assume that the groupG has representations that give square-integrable
coherent state systems (see page 43 of [34]). For instance this is the case for all rep-
resentations of compact semisimple groups, representations of discrete series for real
semisimple groups, and some representations of solvable Lie groups.
Let G be an arbitrary such group, and let V (g) be one of its unitary irreducible
representations acting on a Hilbert space H . Assume that G is acting transitively on
a space ΩΘ, and fix θ0 ∈ ΩΘ. Then every θ ∈ ΩΘ can be written as θ = gθ0 for some
g ∈ G. I also assume that the isotropy group of G is trivial. Then this establishes a
one-to-one correspondence between G and ΩΘ.
Also, fix a vector |θ0〉 ∈H , and define the coherent states |θ 〉= |θ (g)〉=V (g)|θ0〉.
With ν being the left invariant measure on ΩΘ, introduce the operator
T =
∫
|θ (g)〉〈θ (g)|dν(gθ0). (7)
Note that the measure here is over ΩΘ, but the elements are parametrized by G. T is
assumed to be a finite operator.
Lemma 2. T commutes with every V (h);h ∈G.
Proof. V (h)T =
∫
V (h)|θ (g)〉〈θ (g)|dν(gθ0) =
∫
|θ (hg)〉〈θ (g)|dν(gθ0)
=
∫
|θ (r)〉〈θ (h−1r)|dν(h−1rθ0).
Since |θ (h−1r)〉=V (h−1r)|θ0〉=V(h−1)V (r)|θ0〉=V(h)†|θ (r)〉, we have 〈θ (h−1r)|=
〈θ (r)|V (h), and since the measure ν is left-invariant, it follows that V (h)T = TV (h).

From the above and Schur’s Lemma it follows that T = λ I for some λ . Since T
by construction only can have postive eigenvalues, we must have λ > 0. Defining the
measure dµ(θ ) = λ−1dν(θ ) we therefore have the important resolution of the identity
∫
|θ 〉〈θ |dµ(θ ) = I. (8)
For a more elaborate similar construction taking into account the socalled isotropy
subgroup, see Chapter 2 of [34]. In [8] a corresponding resolution of the identity is
derived for states defined through representations of the group K acting on ΩΦ.
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4.3 Quantum operators
Let now θ be a maximally accessible variable, and let G be a group acting on θ .
In general, an operator corresponding to θ may be defined by
A= Aθ =
∫
θ |θ 〉〈θ |dµ(θ ). (9)
A is defined on a domain D(A) of vectors |v〉 ∈H where the integral defining 〈v|A|v〉
converges.
This mapping from an accessible variable θ to an operator A has the following
properties:
(i) If θ = 1, then A= I.
(ii) If θ is real-valued, then A is symmetric (for a definition of this concept for
operators and its relationship to self-adjointness, see [36].)
(iii) The change of basis through a unitary transformation is straightforward.
For further important properties, we need some more theory. First consider the
situation where we regard the group G as generated by a group K defined on the space
of an inaccessible variable φ . This represents no problem if the mapping from φ to θ
is permissible, a case discussed in [8], and in this case the operators corresponding to
several accessible variables can be defined on the same Hilbert space. In the opposite
case we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let H be the subgroup of K consisting of any transformation h such
that θ (hφ) = gθ (φ) for some g ∈ G. Then H is the maximal group under which the
e-variable θ is permissible.
Proof. Let θ (φ1)= θ (φ2) for all θ ∈Θ. Then for h∈H we have θ (hφ1)= gθ (φ1)=
gθ (φ2) = θ (hφ2), thus θ is permissible under the group H. For a larger group, this
argument does not hold. 
Next look at the mapping from θ to Aθ defined by (9).
Theorem 3. For g ∈G, V (g−1)AV (g) is mapped by θ ′ = gθ .
Proof. V (g−1)AV (g) =
∫
θ |g−1θ 〉〈g−1θ |dµ(θ ) =
∫
gθ |θ 〉〈θ |dµ(gθ ).
Use the invariance of µ . 
Further properties of the mapping from θ to A may be developed in a similar way.
The mapping corresponds to the usual way that the operators are allocated to observ-
ables in the quantum mechanical literature. But note that this mapping comes naturally
here from the notions of conceptual variable and e-variables on which group actions
are defined.
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4.4 The spectral theorem and operators for functions of θ
Assume that θ is real-valued. Then based on the spectral theorem (e.g., [36]) we have
that there exists a projectionvalued measure, E on ΩΘ such that for |v〉 ∈ D(A)
〈v|A|v〉=
∫
σ(A)
θd〈v|E(θ )|v〉. (10)
Here σ(A) is the spectrum of A as defined in [36]. The case with a discrete spectrum
is discussed in the next subsection.
A more informal way to write (10) is
A=
∫
σ(A)
θdE(θ ).
This defines a resolution of the identity
∫
σ(A)
dE(θ ) = I. (11)
From this, we can define the operator of an arbitrary Borel-measurable function of
θ by
A f (θ) =
∫
σ(A)
f (θ )dE(θ ). (12)
Important special cases include f (θ ) = I(θ ∈ B) for sets B. Another important
observation is the following: Any accessible variable can be written as f (θ ), where θ
is maximally accessible.
A further important case is connected to statistical inference theory in the way it is
advocated in [1]. Assume that there are data X and a statistical model for these data of
the form P(X ∈C|θ ) for sets C. Then a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) on
the data space can be defined by
M(C) =
∫
σ(A)
P(X ∈C|θ )dE(θ ). (13)
The density of M at a point x is called the likelihood effect in [1], and is the basis for
the focused likelihood principle formulated there; see Section 8 below.
Finally, given a probability measure with density pi(θ ) over the values of θ , one
can define a density operator σ by
σ =
∫
σ(A)
pi(θ )dE(θ ). (14)
In [1] the probability measure pi was assumed to have one out of three possible
interpretations: 1) as a Bayesian prior, 2) as a Bayesian posterior or 3) as a frequentist
confidence distribution (see [11]).
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4.5 The case of a purely discrete spectrum
Note that the construction in the previous subsections can be made for any accessible
conceptual variable θ . Assume now that A has a purely discrete spectrum. θ may be a
vector. Then A is a tensor product of commuting operators.
Let the eigenvalues be {u j} and let the corresponding eigenspaces be {V j}. The
vectors of these eigenspaces are defined as quantum states, and as in [1], each eigenspace
V j is associated with a question ‘What is the value of θ?’ together with a definite an-
swer ‘θ = u j’. This assumes that the set of values of θ can be reduced to this set of
eigenvalues, which I will justify as follows.
Theorem 4. Assume that the group G is transitive on ΩΘ. Then if one of the
values of θ is an eigenvalue of A, all the values of θ are eigenvalues of A, and G is a
permutation group on these eigenvalues.
Proof. For each j, let | j〉 be an eigenvector of A with eigenvalue u j, and let g ∈ G.
By Theorem 3 we have that the operator V (g−1)AV (g) is mapped by gθ . Fix θ0 ∈ ΩΘ,
and assume that θ0 = u j for some j. We need to show that gθ0 is another eigenvalue
for A, which follows from the fact that |V (g−1)AV (g)−λ I| = |A−λ I|, so that these
two determinants have the same zeros. It is assumed that G is transitive, so this gives
all values in ΩΘ and at the same time all eigenvalues of A. 
It is crucial for this whole discussion that the group G is transitive on ΩΘ. If this
is not the case, one can use model reduction. The following principle has been proved
useful in statistical inference. (See discussion and examples in [1], and an important
application in [37, 38].)
Principle When a group G is defined on the parameter space, every model reduc-
tion should be to an orbit or to a set of orbits of this group.
In a quantum setting every model should be reduced to a single orbit. This can be
seen as a general principle for quantization.
We also have the following:
Theorem 5. Assume that the set of measurable values of θ is restricted to the
above eigenvalues. Then θ is maximally accessible if and only if each eigenspace V j is
one-dimensional.
Proof. The assertion that there exists an eigenspace that is not one-dimensional,
is equivalent with the following: Some eigenvalue u j correspond to at least two or-
thogonal eigenvectors | j〉 and |i〉. Based on the spectral theorem, the operator A corre-
sponding to θ can be written as ∑r urPr, where Pr is the projection upon the eigenspace
Vr. Now define a new e-variable ψ whose operator B has the following properties: If
r 6= j, the eigenvalues and eigenspaces of B are equal to those of A. If r = j, B has
two different eigenvalues on the two one-dimensional spaces spanned by | j〉 and |i〉,
respectively, otherwise its eventual eigenvalues are equal to u j in the space V j. Then
θ = θ (ψ), and ψ 6= θ is inaccessible if and only if θ is maximally accessible. This
construction is impossible if and only if all eigenspaces are one-dimensional. 
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5 Coupling different foci together
5.1 Two maximally accessible variables
Let λ 1 and λ 2 be two maximally accessible variables, and let φ = (λ 1,λ 2). An exam-
ple may be λ 1 =position and λ 2=momentum of a particle. Assume that a group G1
is defined on Ωλ 1 , a group G
2 on Ωλ 2 , and let K = G
1⊗G2. In this case it is easy to
see that each λ i(φ) is a permissible function of φ , and the discussion of subsection 4.2
leads to resolutions of the identity
∫
|λ i〉〈λ i|dµ i(λ i) = I. (15)
It may be convenient to treat each λ i explicitly as a function of φ , and let µ i be the
marginalization of a measure τ i on Ωφ . Then it follows that
∫
|λ i(φ)〉〈λ i(φ)|dτ i(φ) = I, (16)
and we may define operators
Ai =
∫
λ i(φ)|λ i(φ)〉〈λ i(φ)|dτ i(φ). (17)
One point is that both operators can be defined on the same Hilbert space. By
maximality, only one of λ 1 or λ 2 can be measured on the system at a given time. This
is a manifestation of Niels Bohr’s complementarity.
I will continue to discuss the case where the operator corresponding to λ has a
discrete spectrum.
5.2 Maximally accessible discrete variables
In this section consider a Hilbert space H of finite dimension d. Again let φ be an
inaccessible conceptual variable. For an index set A , focus on λ a for a ∈ A , a set
of maximally accessible variables. Assume now that each mapping φ 7→ λ a(φ) is
permissible, so that K induces a group Ga acting upon λ a. Then each λ a corresponds
to a unique operator Aa, and this operator has the spectral decomposition
Aa = ∑
j
uaj |a; j〉〈a; j|. (18)
Again by maximality, only one λ a can be measured on the system at a given time.
5.3 Non maximally accessible discrete variables
First go back to the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. Let again λ a = λ a(φ) be
as in the previous subsection. Let ta be an arbitrary function on the range of λ a, and let
us focus on θ a = ta(λ a) for each a ∈A .
Let the Hilbert space be as in the previous subsection, and suppose that it has an
orthonormal basis that can be written in the form |a; i〉 for i= 1, ...,d. Let {uai } be the
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values of λ a, and let {saj} be the values of θ a. DefineCaj = {i : ta(uai ) = saj}, and letV aj
be the space spanned by {|a; i〉 : i ∈Caj }. Let Πaj be the projection upon V aj .
Then we have the following interpretation of any |a; i〉 ∈ V aj . (1) the question:
‘What is the value of θ a?’ has been posed, and (2) we have obtained the answer
θ a = saj . Note that in this case, several pairs (a, i) correspond to a given vector |v〉.
From the above construction we may also define the operator connected to the e-
variable θ a as
Aa = ∑
j
sajΠ
a
j = ∑
i
ta(uai )|a; i〉〈a; i|. (19)
Note that this gives all possible states and all possible values corresponding to the
accessible e-variable θ a. Unless the function ta is bijective, the operator Aa has no
longer distinct eigenvalues.
6 The spin case
Let φ be the total spin vector of a particle, and let θ a = ‖φ‖cos(φ ,a) be the component
of φ in the direction a. If we have a coordinate system, the components θ x,θ y and θ z
are of special interest. As pointed out by Yoh Tanimoto, the following example shows
that these components are not permissible if K is the rotation group for some fixed ‖φ‖:
Take φ1 = (1,0,0), φ2 = (0,1,0), and let k be the rotation in the xz-plane such that
kφ1 = (0,0,1) and kφ2 = (0,1,0). Then the z-components of φ1 and φ2 are equal, but
the z-components of kφ1 and kφ2 are different.
But note that (contrary to the discussion in [8]) the homomorphism from the group
K acting on φ to the group Ga acting on θ a (here the permutation group) was not used
in Section 4 above. If necessary, given a spin component θ a in the direction a, one can
consider the largest subgroup for which the mapping from φ to θ a(φ) is permissible.
Such a subgroup always exists (Theorem 2 above). In the present case it consists of all
rotations around a together with a reflection in the plane orthogonal to a.
The orbits of the corresponding group acting on θ a are simply ±c for c > 0. By
using a suitable scale and the principle that a reduced model should be to an orbit or a
set of orbits of the relevant group, one can argue that the possible values of θ a should
be −r,−r+ 1, ...,r− 1,r for a non-negative integer or half-integer r.
The purpose of the general discussion in [8] was to give a firm basis to the statement
that a common Hilbert space can be chosen to find operators for each variable θ a. For
spin components thus a special argument must be given for this.
Spin coherent states and their connection to the group SU(2) are discussed thor-
oughly in [34] and [39]. I will follow parts of [34] without going into details. It is
crucial that any irreducible representation D is given by a nonnegative integer or half-
integer r: D(k) = Dr(k), dim(Dr) = d = 2r+ 1. In the representation space H = Hr
the canonical basis |r;m〉 exists, where m runs from −r to r in unit steps. Seen as ma-
trices, the operators D(k) may be taken to act on the d-dimensional vector space Cd .
These matrix representation is discussed in many books, for instance [40]. It is stated
on op. cit., page 129 that D is a single-valued representation of the group SO(3) when
r is an integer, a double-valued representation when r is half of an odd integer. In all
cases it is a representation of SU(2).
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The infinitesimal operators A± = Ax± iAy, A0 = Az of the group representation Dr
satisfy the commutation relations
[A0,A±] =±A±, [A−,A+] =−2A0. (20)
The operators Ax, Ay and Az are related to infinitesimal rotations around the x-axis,
y-axis and z-axis, respectively, and we takeA= (Ax,Ay,Az). The representation space
vectors |r;m〉 are eigenvectors for the operators A0 andA2 = (Ax)2+(Ay)2+(Az)2:
A0|r;m〉= m|r;m〉, A2|r;m〉= r(r+ 1)|r;m〉. (21)
The operator exp[iω(n ·A)], ‖n‖= 1, describes the rotation by the angle ω around
the axis directed alongn. In [34] this was used to describe the coherent states D(k)|φ0〉
in various ways. The ket vector |φ0〉 may be taken as |r;m〉 for a fixed m; the simplest
choice is m=−r.
7 Interpretation of quantum states and variables
The following simple observation should be noted, and is in correspondence with the
ordinary textbook interpretation of quantum states: Trivially, every vector |v〉 is the
eigenvector of some operators. Assume that there is one such operator A that is phys-
ically meaningful, and for which |v〉 is also a non-degenerate eigenvector, say with a
corresponding eigenvalue u. Let λ be a physical variable associated with A. Then |v〉
can be interpreted as the question ‘What is the value of λ?’ along with the definite
answer λ = u.
More generally, accepting operators with non-gerenerate eigenspaces (correspond-
ing to observables that are accessible, but not maximally accessible), each eigenspace
can be interpreted as a question along with an answer to this question.
Binding together these two paragraphs, we can think of the case where λ is a vector,
such that each component λi corresponds to an operator Ai, and these operators are
mutually commuting. Then A =
⊗
iAi has eigenspaces which can be interpreted as a
set of questions ‘What is the value of λi i = 1,2, ...?’ together with sharp answers to
these questions. In the special case of systems of qubits, Höhn and Wever [67] have
recently proved that there is a one-to-one correspondence here.
The following is proven in [1, 41] under certain general technical conditions, and
also specifically in the case of spin/ angular momentum: Given a vector |v〉 in a Hilbert
space H and a number u, there is at most one pair (a, j) such that |a; j〉= |v〉 modulus
a phase factor, and |a; j〉 is an eigenvector of an operator Aa with eigenvalue u.
The main interpretation in [1, 41] is motivated as follows: Suppose the existence
of such a vector |v〉 with |v〉 = |a; j〉 for some a and j. Then the fact that the state of
the system is |v〉means that one has focused on a question (‘What is the value of λ a?’)
and obtained the definite answer (λ a = u.) The question can be associated with the
orthonormal basis {|a; j〉; j = 1,2, ...,d}, equivalently with a resolution of the identity
I = ∑ j |a; j〉〈a; j|.
The general technical result of [1, 41] is also valid in the case where λ a and u are
real-valued vectors. After this we are left with the problem of determining the exact
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conditions under which all vectors |v〉 ∈ H in the non-degerate discrete case and all
projection operators in the general case can be interpreted as above. This will require a
rich index set A determining the index a. This problem will not be considered further
here, but this is stated as a general question to the quantum community in [41]. But
from the evidence above, I will in this paper rely on the conjecture that each quantum
state/ eigenvector space can be associated in a unique way with a question-and-answer
pair.
When λ is a continuous variable or even a more general variable, we can still inter-
pret the eigenspaces of the operator A as questions ‘What is the value of λ?’ together
with answers in terms of intervals for λ . This is related to the spectral decomposition
of A, which gives the resolution of the identity (recall (11))
I =
∫
σ(A)
dE(λ ). (22)
This resolution of the identity is tightly coupled to the question ‘What is the value
of λ?’, and it implies projections related to indicators of intervals/setsC for λ as
Π(C) =
∫
σ(A)∩C
dE(λ ). (23)
All this can be seen as the general epistemic interpretation of quantum states and
projection operators. It is related to the QBist interpretation, but is more general. It can
also be seen as a concrete specification of the Relational Quantum Mechanics and of
interpretations related to information.
In (22, 23) λ may be seen as a maximally accessible variable. If θ is another
maximally accessible variable, it will be associated with another operator B, and A and
B will not be commuting. We can then say that λ and θ are complementary variables
in the sense of Bohr. In a physical context, Niels Bohr’s complementarity concept has
been thoroughly discussed by Plotnitsky [42].
Here is Plotnitsky’s definition of complementarity:
(a) a mutual exclusivity of certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet
(b) the possibility of applying each one of them separately at any given point; and
(c) the necessity of using all of them at different moments for a comprehensive
account of the totality of phenomena that we consider.
This definition points at the physical situation discussed above, and has Niels Bohr’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics as a point of departure. However, in my opinion
the definition can also be carried over to a long range of macroscopic phenomena or
conceptions. In particular, the concept is useful in connection to quantum cognitive
modeling [28, 29, 43] and in quantum decision theory, see Yukalov and Sornette [44,
45, 46, 47, 48].
8 Focused likelihood
Assume that we have focused on some index a ∈ A and on an experiment with pa-
rameter θ a and data xa. In much of the quantum theory literature, θ a is discrete, and
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one does not distinguish between θ a and xa. However I will think of θ a as a general
parameter, typically continuous, and I will model the uncertainty of the measurement
apparatus by a statistical model. Then this statistical model gives a likelihood f (xa|θ a),
and we can define the likelihood effect
Fa(xa) =
∫
σ(Aa)
f (xa|θ a = u)dEa(u), (24)
where σ(Aa) is the spectrum of the operator Aa corresponding to θ a, and Ea is the
corresponding projection valued measure. I rely here on the discussion of Section 4.4.
This is a generalization of an ordinary definition in quantum theory, where any operator
F = ∑ j p jΠ j so that 0 ≤ p j ≤ 1 and I = ∑ j Π j is a resolution of the identity, is called
an effect. Note that the discrete version of (24) is Fa(xa) = ∑ j p(x
a|θ a = uaj)Πa(uaj),
where p(xa|θ a = uaj) is a point probability, so this is obviously an effect. That the
general likelihood is an effect, follows by a limiting argument.
The likelihood principle of statistical inference (see Subsection 10.1) says all exper-
imental information from a given experiment a is contained in the likelihood f (xa|θ a).
In [1] a discrete version of a focused likelihood principle was proved under a certain
regularity condition. Here I formulate the more general principle:
The focused likelihood principle. Consider the choice of maximally accessible
experiments a that are subject to the same inaccessible variable φ . Let qa(θ a|xa) be the
experimental evidence from experiment a, for instance a posterior probability. Then,
taking into account the choice of a, qa is a function of the likelihood effect: qa =
q(Fa(xa)).
Theorem 6. The focused likelihood principle follows from the ordinary likelihood
principle.
Proof. I will prove the discrete version; the general case follows by an extension of
the argument. So let Fa(xa) =∑ j p(x
a|θ a = uaj)Πa(uaj), where Πa(uaj) is the projection
upon the eigenspace of the operator Aa corresponding to the eigenvalue uaj . In many
applications uaj can be chosen to be independent of a. If not, let {u j} be the union of all
uaj ;a ∈ A , and define Πa(u j) = 0 if u j is not an eigenvalue of Aa. Then we can write
Fa(xa) = ∑ j p(x
a|θ a = u j)Πa(u j). Now assume that Fa(xa) = Fb(xb) for two indices
a and b. Then it follows from Proposition 5.5 in [1] that the eigenspaces can be ordered
such that 1) Πa(u j) = Πb(u j); j = 1,2, ...; 2); 2) p(xa|θ a = u j) = p(xb|θ b = u j) when
both are defined. From 1) it follows that the experimental questions connected to a
and b are coinciding. 2) together with the ordinary likelihood principle implies that the
experimental evidences are equal. 
9 The Born formula
I start with the discrete case and a maximally accessible variable θ a defined in connec-
tion to an agent B and a physical system S. It is crucial that θ a is maximally accessible,
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and that it has already been accurately measured by B to a value θ a = uai . By the theory
already considered here, this gives a unique state |a; i〉.
Now consider another variable θ b connected to B and S. Born’s formula, the basis
for quantum probability calculations, gives the probability distribution of θ b in this
situation.
As in [1] I make some assumptions coupled to the agent B. I do not see B as being
perfectly rational, but during his experiment he adhers to certain ideals, and these ideals
can be modeled by a superior actor D which is perfectly rational. I assume that D has
priors found in some way, so that he can do a Bayesian analysis. The experimental
evidence connected to D is then given by his posterior probabilities q = qa depending
on the data xa. The focused likelihood principle, specialized to a single experiment,
states that the experimental evidence, including the questions related to this evidence,
must be a function of the likelihood effect. Thus qa must be a function of the likelihood
effect qa = q(Fa).
Note that I do not assume that B has a prior and is able to do a Bayesian analysis,
only that the ideal actor D is able to act as a Bayesian.
The perfect rationality ofD is formulated in terms of hypothetical betting situations
and
The Dutch Book Principle. No choice of payoffs in a series of bets shall lead to a
sure loss for the bettor.
The setting described above is called a rational epistemic setting. It is assumed that
the (focused) likelihood principle holds. The following theorem is proved in [1]:
Theorem 7. Assume a rational epistemic setting. Let F1,F2, ... be likelihood effects
in this setting, and assume that F1+F2+ ... also is a likelihood effect. Then
q(F1+F2+ ...) = q(F1)+ q(F2)+ .... (25)
When F1,F2, ... belong to the same experiment, this is quite obvious, but it is proved
also for the case where the experiments are different. A function q(·) satisfying the
countable additivity condition (25) and in addition 0≤ q(F)≤ 1 for all F and q(I) = 1,
is called a generalized probability measure. In [49, 50] it is called a frame function. I
can now make use of the following theorem by Busch [51], cp. also [49]:
Theorem 8. Any generalized probability measure is of the form q(F) = trace(σF)
for some density operator σ .
The arguments above are valid for any sets of experiments in a rational epistemic
setting, where q = q(F) is some probability, a function of the likelihood effect, which
in some way expresses the experimental evidence of the experiment connected to the
likelihood effect F .
Define now a perfect experiment as one where the measurement uncertainty can
be disregarded. The quantum mechanical literature operates very much with perfect
experiments which give well-defined states | j〉. From the point of view of statistics, if,
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say the 99% confidence or credibility region of θ is the single point u j, we can infer
approximately that a perfect experiment has given the result θ = u j.
Assume now that we have prepared the system by a perfect experiment giving the
result θ a = ui for some accessible variable θ a. Let us then do a new perfect experi-
ment, asking the question ‘What is the value of θ b?’ for a new accessible variable θ b.
Assume to begin with that both the accessible variables are maximal, so that the rele-
vant eigenvalues are non-degenerate with eigenvectors |a; i〉, respectively |b; j〉. Then
the following is proved in [1] from Theorem 8:
Theorem 9. Born’s formula. Assume a rational epistemic setting. In the above
sitiuation we have
P(θ b = ubj |θ a = uai ) = |〈a; i|b; j〉|2. (26)
There are several generalizations of this Born formula. One can let the last eigen-
value be degenerate with projector Πbj on the eigenvector space corresponding to θ
b =
ubj . Then the righthand side of (3) should be replaced by 〈a; i|Πbj |a; i〉. And the first
preperatorial experiment can be one where we only have probabilities for the different
values uai , resulting in a density operator σ
a. Then P(θ b = ubj |σa) = trace(Πbjσa).
It is of some interest that Theorem 8, which is the basis, also is valid for non-perfect
experiments. Following the same arguments, this leads to (40) and (41) below, which
can be related to quantum measurement theory.
Finally, the Born formula can be extended to the continuous case. In order to for-
mulate the most general case, let the system be prepared in a mixed state with density
σa =
∫
pi(θ a)dEa(θ a), and let us consider an experiment with a new accessible vari-
able θ b whose operator has a spectral distribution dEb(θ b). The data x of the exper-
iment has a statistical model which gives P(x ∈ C|θ b) for sets C in the sample space.
It is assumed that the model is dominated: P(x ∈C|θ b) = ∫C f (x|θ b)dξ (z) for a likeli-
hood f (x|θ ) and a measure ξ on the sample space. Then one can define the likelihood
effect
Fb(x) =
∫
θb
f (x|θ b)dEb(θ b), (27)
and the focused likelihood principle holds. The continuous Born formula may be writ-
ten
f (x|σa) = trace(Fb(x)σa). (28)
Note that
∫
Fb(x)dξ (x) = I, so that one can define an positive operator valued
measureM by
M(C) =
∫
C
Fb(x)dξ (x) =
∫
θb
P(X ∈C|θ b)dEb(θ b). (29)
As an application of the discrete version of Born’s formula, we give the transition
probabilities for spin 1/2 particles. I will, for a given direction a define θ a =+1 if the
measured spin component by a perfect measurement for some given particle is +h¯/2
in this direction, θ a = −1 if the component is −h¯/2. Assume that a and b are two
directions in which the spin component can be measured.
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Proposition 1. For a spin 1/2 particle we have
P(θ b =±1|θ a =+1) = 1
2
(1± cos(a ·b)). (30)
This is proved in many textbooks, and also in [30].
It is interesting that a similar derivation of the Born rule from frame functions is
discussed in [49, 50]. In [50] a more abstract setting is considered, so that in addition to
the Born rule, the corresponding state-updating rule (the collapse rule) can be derived
from the same setting. It is stated in the introduction to [50] that the authors want
to breathe new life into the knowledge-based view of quantum theory. In the present
paper I share the same ambition; in my vocabulary, knowledge-based is the same as
epistemic.
The derivations of Sections 4-9 now give a starting point for the development of
quantum theory as it is given in many textbooks and also in Chapter 5 of [1]. The
Schrödinger equation is also developed from an epistemic point of view in [1].
10 Some statistical inference theory
Statistical inference theory was mentioned on several occations above. I now give
an introduction to 3 approaches to statistical inference. After this, I will discuss an
example and some brief elements of quantummeasurement theory, in order to illustrate
more closely the connections between quantum theory and statistical inference theory,
as I see it.
10.1 Frequentist and Bayesian inference
The basic notions of statistical inference are data X , varying in a space ΩX , a vector
or scalar parameter θ varying in a space ΩΘ and a statistical model defined as follows:
There is a σ -algebra EX of subsets of ΩX , and for each θ ∈ ΩΘ there is a probability
measure PθX on the measurable space (ΩX ,EX). Usually one assumes that this family of
probability models is dominated: There exist a measure ξ on (ΩX ,EX) and a likelihood
function f (x|θ ) such that dPθX = f (x|θ )dξ .
In statistics, θ is thought to model the unknown feature that one is interested in,
the state of the system in question. The data X are the potential observations, and the
purpose of the modeling is multifold: To give a rough description of the data generating
process; provide parameters that can be estimated from data; allow focusing on certain
parameters; give a language for asking questions about nature, and give a possibility to
study deviations from the model and choosing new models.
Here I will concentrate on asking questions about nature, in particular on estimating
θ from observations. Given observed data X = x, one makes a decision δ (x), where
the function δ is thought to vary on some action space ΩA. From this point of view,
one can say that statistical inference is the science of finding an optimal δ in concrete
problems.
22
The simplest concept is that of point estimation: The parameter θ is estimated by
a function of the data: θˆ (x). The properties of this estimation procedure is evaluated
by looking at the before-experimental situation and using the statistical model: With
the stochastic variable X inserted, θˆ (X) is called an estimator. One good property
might be that the estimator is unbiased: Eθ (θˆ (X)) = θ for all θ , exactly or perhaps
approximately. Another good property may be that it has a small variance. These two
properties are sometimes combined in the requirement that the estimator should have a
mean square error that is as small as possible, where the mean square error is defined
as
MSE(θˆ (X)) = Eθ ((θˆ (X)−θ )2) =Varθ (θˆ (X))+ (Eθ (θˆ (X)−θ ))2. (31)
In amore general decision situation onemay have defined a loss function γ(θ ,δ (x))
that one may wish to minimize in some sense. The first step is then to define the risk
R(δ ,θ ) = Eθ (γ(θ ,δ (X))). (32)
A basic problem is that the risk in almost all cases cannot be minimized uniformly
for all θ . Which way one proceeds with this problem, depends on what school one
wants to adhere to. One way to go on, is to limit oneself in the point estimation case to
unbiased estimators; for this theory and related theories, see [52].
A related problem on the case of a real-valued θ is to find an interval from data
in which one believes that θ belongs. Again the solution depends on what school one
wants to adhere to. I first describe the solution of the frequentist school.
One is in a situation where the data are given, but still one wants to use the statistical
model as if one was in a pre-experimental situation. This presupposes an hypothetical
future experiment completely equivalent to the experiment that one has performed, and
that one evaluates probabilities connected to this future experiment. Given a confidence
coefficient 1−α , say 0.95, the aim is then to find lower and upper estimators θ and θ¯
such that
Pθ (θ (X)≤ θ ≤ θ¯ (X)) = 1−α. (33)
One then reports a confidence interval [θ (x), θ¯ (x)].
Again a related problem is that of hypothesis testing, say that one wants to test a
null hypothesis θ = θ0. An important concept is then that of the alternative hypothesis.
Say that one considers a one-sided alternative θ > θ0, has found a point estimator θˆ for
θ and the value θˆ (x) for the experimental data at hand. One may then report a p-value
p= Pθ0(θˆ (X)> θˆ (x)), (34)
refering to a hypothetical experiment under the null hypothesis, giving the result X . If
the p-value is small, a traditional limit has been 0.05, the finding of the experiment is
reported as being significant.
The p-values have been very much used in empirical research, and this use has been
heavily attacked recently. One problem is that when many questions are addressed, in
one or in several studies, the overall probability of getting a ‘significant’ result is large.
The conclusion is that one should be very careful with the automatic use of p-values.
Often the report of a confidence interval will be more informative.
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In concrete experiments one often has data X that consists of several independent
observations, in general one may have have very much data. One mechanism by which
one can reduce data, is related to the concept of sufficiency. A function T of the data
is called a statistic. A statistic T is called sufficient if the distribution of X , given T
and θ , is independent of θ . Under weak conditions one then has factorization of the
likelihood
f (x|θ ) = h(x)g(T (x)|θ ). (35)
Thus the essential part of the observation is T(x); apart from this, the data from the
model could have been obtained by independent computer simulation. This is related
to the sufficiency principle: If data x1 and x2 have T (x1) = T (x2), then x1 and x2 contain
the same experimental evidence about θ . Here the concept ‘experimental evidence’ is
left undefined.
Birnbaum showed (see [1]) that the sufficiency principle together with an equally
intuitive conditionality principle imply the likelihood principle: If x1 and x2 have pro-
portional likelihood functions, where the constant of proportionality is independent of
θ , then x1 and x2 contain the same experimental evidence about θ . Thus all information
about θ is contained in the likelihood function.
There have been discussions also around the likelihood principle. In [1] the view is
advocated that the likelihood principle should be taken as conditional, given the context
of the experiment.
A completely different approach to statistical inference is given by the Bayesian
school. Bayesian inference is possible if one has a prior distribution P(dθ ) of the
parameter. Then one can define a Bayesian risk
B(δ ) =
∫
R(δ ,θ )P(dθ ), (36)
where R(δ ,θ ) is given by (32), and the problem is simply to find the decision rule that
minimizes B(δ ). In the case of point estimation and quadratic loss function for given
data, this leads to
θˆ (x) =
∫
θP(dθ |x), (37)
where
P(dθ |x) = l(x|θ )P(dθ )∫
l(x[η)P(dη)
. (38)
The distribution (38) is called the posterior distribution of θ , and is a fundamental tool
of Bayesian inference. (38) is an instance of Bayes’ formula.
Under the posterior distribution, the parameter Θ is a random quantity, and (37)
may be written θˆ(x) = E(Θ|x).
The Bayesian concept corresponding to a confidence interval is that of a credibility
interval: Assume that one can find θ∗(x) and θ ∗(x) such that
P(θ∗(x)≤ Θ ≤ θ ∗(x)|X = x) = 1−α. (39)
Then [θ∗(x),θ ∗(x)] is called a credibility interval for Θ with credibility coefficient 1−
α . Note that, in contrast to (33), the probabilities are now computed directly from the
posterior distribution of Θ.
24
The main problem of the Bayesian approach to inference is to find a prior P(dθ ).
A subjective Bayesian will say that this always can be specified by the user; sometimes
one here makes use of a hypothetical betting construction. Another school relies on
an ‘objective’ prior; one such approach assumes that there is a group defined on the
parameter space.
Sometimes, but not always, one starts with a group G∗ acting on the sample space
ΩX , so that this induces a group G on the parameter space by assuming that the model
parameter is uniquely determined by the model: gθ is defined by PgθX = P
θ
gX . This
defines a group homomorphism, sometimes an isomorphism. Also, there is a group
G∗∗ acting on the action space ΩA, and it is assumed that there is an homomorphism
from G∗ to G∗∗ defined through an permissible inference rule: g∗∗δ (x) = δ (g∗x). If
the action is an estimation procedure, and the homomorphism from G∗ to G is an iso-
morphism, it is natural to assume also that this last homomorphism is an isomorphism.
Also, one usually assumes that the loss function satisfies γ(gθ ,g∗∗a) = γ(θ ,a). In the
isomorphism case, I will use the symbols G,g instead of G∗,g∗ and G∗∗,g∗∗.
An estimator θˆ(X) is called equivariant if it transforms under the group in the same
way as the parameter θ , i.e., gθˆ (X) = θˆ (g∗X). More generally, a decision rule is called
invariant if g∗∗δ (x) = δ (g∗x) for all x. The risk function (32) of an invariant decision
rule is constant on orbits of θ , see [58]. In the transitive case this leads to a unique
invariant decision rule, see also [53].
When a groupG is defined on the parameter space, there are many arguments to the
effect that the right invariant measure connected to G should be used as an objective
prior for θ . (See [30], for instance.) An argument sometimes raised against this, is
that it very often leads to improper priors. As recently shown in [53], however, this
problem can be solved by a slight relaxation of Kolmogorov’s axioms if the marginal
law of X is σ -finite: There are events B1,B2, ... with ΩX =∪iBi and P(X ∈ Bi)< ∞ for
i= 1,2, ....
For comparing statistical inference theory with quantum theory, we need to con-
sider the case where both the parameter and the data are discrete. Then, with enough
data, the credibility interval or the confidence interval may shrink to a single point θ0,
so that P(Θ= θ0|X = x) = 1−α , respectively P(θˆ (X) = θ0) = 1−α . When α is small
enough, we may then identify the post-experimental parameter value with θ0, and thus
disregard experimental error. This explains why there is no distinction between data
and parameters in quantum mechanical textbooks.
A classical statistical text treating both Bayesian and frequentist inference, is Berger
[35]. Otherwise, there are many textbooks on statistical inference, for instance Bickel
and Doksum [54]. Ferguson [55] is a classical text using a decision theoretical ap-
proach. For more on the case where a group is defined on the parameter space, see [30]
and [56]. One can also refer to the discussion in [1].
10.2 Fiducial theory
For an introduction to fiducial inference, the third approach to statistical inference, see
for instance [57]. Fiducial inference as an alternative to Bayesian inference was first
proposed by Fisher [58], has been in discredit for many years, but has been the subject
to several investigations recently. I use some space to it here because it is a distinctly
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new approach to statistical inference, different from frequentist and Bayesian inference.
And the use in [57] of a transitive group defined on the parameter space is similar to
one of my assumptions behind my approach to quantum mechanics.
The connections between optimal statistical inference and fiducial models are also
studied in [57], and this is illustrated by several examples.
10.3 Connection between approaches to statistical inference
For an outsider it may be confusing that there are several schools of statistical inference.
Then it is reassuring that there are connections between these schools. First, in cases
where there is very much data, the different theories give essentially the same result.
In these cases, the effect of the choice if prior vanishes almost completely.
An even closer connection between the theories exists when there is a transitive
group G defined on the parameter space. Then there is a classical result by Fraser [59,
60] and generalized by Taraldsen and Lindqvist [61] saying that the fiducial distribution
coincides with the Bayesian posterior from the right invariant measure as a prior.
There is also a close connection between Bayesian and frequentist inference in this
case: In [30] the following general result is proved (recall the definition of a proper
group in Section 2. An estimator is equivariant if it transforms under G in the same
way as the corresponding parameter):
Proposition 2. Assume that G is proper and is acting transitively both on ΩX
and on ΩΘ. Consider frequentist inference on one hand and Bayesian inference with
right invariant prior on the other hand. Let η(θ ) be a one-dimensional continuous
parametric function, and let ηˆ1(x) and ηˆ2(x) be two equivariant estimators of η(θ )
such that ηˆ1(x)< ηˆ2(x) for all x. DefineC(x) = {θ : ηˆ1(x)≤ θ ≤ ηˆ2(x)}. Then C(x) is
a credibility interval and a confidence interval of θ with the same credibility coefficient/
confidence coefficient.
These results seem to give a special status to ‘objective’ Bayesian inference based
on right invariant prior.
11 A macroscopic example
Going back to quantum theory, a very relevant question is now: Are all the results
of Sections 4-9, including Born’s formula, by necessity confined to the microworld?
Recently, physicists have also become interested in larger systems where quantum me-
chanics is valid, see [62]. Of even more interest are the quantum models of cognition,
see [28,29], quantum models in finance (e.g. [43, 63]) and Quantum Decision Theory
[44-48]. As I have defined it, there is nothing microscopic about the epistemic setting.
It may or may not be that the assumptions made above also are valid for some larger
scale systems. The following example illustrates the point.
In a medical experiment, let µa,µb,µc and µd be continuous inaccessible parame-
ters, the hypothetical effects of treatment a,b,c and d, respectively. Assume that the
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focus of the experiment is to compare treatment b with the mean effect of the other
treatments, which is supposed to give the parameter 13(µa + µc+ µd). One wants to
do a pairwise experiment, but it turns out that the maximal parameter which can be
estimated, is
θ b = sign(µb− 1
3
(µa+ µc+ µd)).
(Imagine for example that one has four different ointments against rash. A patient is
treated with ointment b on one side of his back; a mixture of the other ointments on the
other side of his back. It is only possible to observe which side improves best, but this
observation is assumed to be very accurate. One can in principle do the experiment
on several patients, and select out the patients where the difference is clear.) This
experiment is done on a selected set of experimental units, on whom it is known from
earlier accurate experiments that the corresponding parameter
θ a = sign(µa− 1
3
(µb+ µc+ µd))
takes the value +1. In other words, one is interested in the probabilities
pi = P(θ b =+1|θ a =+1).
Consider first a Bayesian approach. Natural priors for µa, ...,µd are independent
normal distributions, N(ν,σ2) with the same ν and σ . By location and scale invari-
ance, there is no loss in generality by assuming ν = 0 and σ = 1. Then the joint prior
of ζ a = µa− 13 (µb+µc+µd) and ζ b = µb− 13(µa+µc+µd) is multinormal with mean
0 and covariance matrix ( 4
3 − 49
− 49 43
)
.
(A vector variable v has a multinormal distribution with meanµ and covariancematrix
Σ if a′v is N(a′µ,a′Σa) for every constant vector a.) A numerical calculation from
this gives
pi = P(ζ b > 0|ζ a > 0)≈ 0.43.
This result can also be assumed to be valid when σ → ∞, a case which in some sense
can be considered as independent objective priors for µa, ...,µd .
Now consider a quantum theory approach to this experiment. Since again scale is
irrelevant, a natural group on µa, ...,µd is a 4-dimensional rotation group around a point
(ν, ...,ν) together with a translation of ν . Furthermore, ζ a and ζ b are contrasts, that is,
linear combinations with coefficients adding to 0. The space of such contrasts is a 3-
dimensional subspace of the original 4-dimensional space, and by a single orthogonal
transformation, the relevant subset of the 4-dimensional rotations can be transformed
into the group G of 3-dimensional rotations on this latter space, and the translation in
ν is irrelevant. One such orthogonal transformation is given by
ψ0 =
1
2
(µa+ µb+ µc+ µd),
ψ1 =
1
2
(−µa− µb+ µc+ µd),
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ψ2 =
1
2
(−µa+ µb− µc+ µd),
ψ3 =
1
2
(−µa+ µb+ µc− µd).
Let G be the group of rotations orthogonal to ψ0. We find
ζ a =−2
3
(ψ1+ψ2+ψ3),
ζ b =−2
3
(ψ1−ψ2−ψ3).
The rotation group element transforming ζ a into ζ b corresponds underG to the rotation
group element gab transforming a=− 1√3 (1,1,1) into b=−
1√
3
(1,−1,−1) in a simpler
rotation group, which may be taken as a rotation of the Bloch sphere for a spin 1/2
system. In conclusion, the whole situation is completely equivalent to the spin-example
of Proposition 1 in Section 9 and satisfies the assumptions of the symmetrical epistemic
setting. Making the rationality assumption then implies:
pi = P(sign(ζ b) = +1|sign(ζ a) = +1) = 1
2
(1+ a ·b) = 1
3
.
I guess that many statisticians will prefer the Bayesian calculations here for the
quantum theory calculations. But the prior chosen in this example must be considered
somewhat arbitrary, and its ’objective’ limit may lead to conceptual difficulties.
The purpose of this example is not primarily to show how quantum theory applies
in a macroscopic setting. Other, perhaps more interesting examples can be found in
cognitive modeling [28, 29] and in economics (e.g., [63]). The purpose is more to
indicate a border area where quantum modeling may or may not be valid, i.e. where
the assumptions made in this article may or may not hold. And to show in a precise
example how one aspect of the different ways of looking at uncertainty in statistical
modelling may in principle be illustrated by a quantum theory calculation.
12 Some quantum measurement theory
Consider first a simple measurement of a maximally accessible discrete variable θ with
associated operator A = ∑n un|n〉〈n|. Let the statistical model for the measurement be
given by P(X = x j|θ = un), assuming discrete data. Then assuming that the physical
system first is prepared in some mixed state σ , one makes a measurement on θ , and the
probability of obtaining the measurement result X = x j is according to the data version
of Born’s formula
p j = P(X = x j|σ) = trace(M( j)σ), (40)
where
M( j) = ∑
n
P(X = x j|θ = un)|n〉〈n|. (41)
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Then the final state must in some way be determined by M( j),σ and p j. Note that
trivially ∑ jM( j) = I. The formula for the final state can be made consistent with the
measurement theory of [64], summarized below, if one can find operators A j such that
M( j) = A†jA j.
This discontinuous change of state has caused much discussion in the literature, but
with an epistemic interpretation of quantum theory it seems to be less problematic: It
just represents an updating of the information that one one has on θ ; deeper reasons
for such updating are given in [50].
According to [64], the most general measurement one can have on a system can
be described as follows: Let {A j} be a set of operators satisfying ∑ jA†jA j = I. We
want to measure a variable θ with possible values un. If σ is the state of the system
before measurements, σ˜ j is the state of the system after obtaining the measurement
result z= z j, and p j is the probability of obtaining this result, then
σ˜ j =
A jσA
†
j
p j
, (42)
p j = trace(A
†
jA jσ). (43)
In general, (42) and (43) give the inference rule implied by the quantum measure-
ment. The arguments behind these formulae, as given in [64], is of interest. I will
sketch a possible starting point of these arguments from a more statistical perspective.
From this perspective, the measurement is described by the data X , and θ is the pa-
rameter of interest. During measurement one goes from the unknown variable (X ,θ )
to the known variable (X = x, θˆ (x)). This transition can be described by a group ele-
ment h ∈ G⊗G, and h can be represented by a unitary operator U =U(h) acting on
the vectors |X = xi〉|θ = u j〉. In [64] similar arguments are given, using the concepts
of probe and target. The existence of the unitary operatorU can also be motivated by a
classical theorem by Wigner [65].
In this language the derivation in [64] starts by conditioning on the data X = x,
giving as a combined initial state the density matrix σcomb = |0〉〈0|⊗σ . The operatorU
is then written in terms of sub-blocks acting on the parameter space asU =∑ j j′ [ j〉〈 j′|⊗
A j j′ , and it is argued that the first column of these blocks, A j =A j0 satisfy the resolution
of the identity I = ∑ jA
†
jA j, and from this and from the initial state the final state (42) is
derived. Alternatively, one could consider the derivation of the corresponding formula
in [50].
The special case when σ = ∑P(n)|n〉〈n| and all the operators A j are diagonal in
the vectors |n〉, i.e., A j = ∑nA( j,n)|n〉〈n|, is also discussed in [64]. This case is shown
to be equivalent with Bayesian inference with priors for θ equal to P(n) and likelihood
function P( j|n) = |A( j,n)|2.
The point of this brief recapitulation of quantum measurement theory is to indi-
cate that quantum measurement is a generalization of Bayesian inference, and that
the prior in this Bayesian inference theory could be anything, subjective or objective.
The Bayesian inference corresponds to the case where everything can be formulated
in terms of the projectors |n〉〈n|, i.e., in a universe where we are only interested in a
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single resolution of the identity I = ∑n |n〉〈n|, thus a single question posed to nature. In
particular, thenM( j) = A†jA j is diagonal in the {|n〉} basis, as indicated in (41).
There are many further aspects of quantum measurement theory, aspects that are
not discussed in this paper.
13 Discussion
The developments given in Sections 4-9 here represent an alternative approach towards
quantum theory, and these discussions should replace parts of Chapter 4 in my book [1].
The discussions are rather technical, but the foundation introduced based on conceptual
inaccessible and accessible conceptual variables, seems to be much more intuitive than
starting directly with the ordinary formal Hilbert space foundation.
The resolutions of the identity (8,11, etc.) are crucial to this approach. They can
be said to represent questions to nature: ‘What is the value of θ?’ for an associated
maximally accessible variable θ , and at the same time they give positive-operator
valued measures. The resolution (8) is special, since the operators involved are not
orthogonal projections.1 In most other cases discussed here, the resolutions of the
identity give directly projection-valued measures. Selecting one concrete projector
Π (eigenspace V for a corresponding operator) gives a sharp answer to the relevant
question to nature.The probabilities associated with these answers are given by the
Born rule p = trace(Πσ) if we start with a state defined by the density operator σ .
Different resolutions of the identity correspond to complementary questions.
The way I use ‘question’ here, a question may be composed of several elemen-
tary questions. This corresponds to the case where θ is a vector, and the operators
corresponding to the elementary questions commute.
As mentioned in the previous Section, ordinary Bayesian inference in a quantum
measurement situation corresponds to the case where we only have a single resolution
of the identity. This is true in the discrete case, but it can be generalized. As thoroughly
discussed in Section 10, there are also other approaches to statistical inference than the
Bayesian one. It is interesting that both frequentist inference and fiducial inference are
connected to ‘objective’ Bayesian inference, the one assuming a transitive group acting
on the parameter space and the use of a right invariant prior.
Group theory, the assumption of a transitive group acting on the variable (parame-
ter) space, is also important for the approach towards quantum theory advocated here.
If we have a group defined on this space which is not transitive, model reduction -
reduction to an orbit of the group - is called for. This is the approach to quantization
advocated here. It is interesting that a similar model reduction also is useful in ordinary
statistical inference.
The example in Section 11 shows that a quantum mechanical approach and a
Bayesian statistical approach in general may give different solutions to an inference
problem.
In [28, 29] it is proposed to use quantum theory in cognitive modeling and in deci-
sion theory. This use of quantum theory is important, but it is not discussed directly in
1By Neumark’s dilation theorem, the POVM here can be ‘lifted’ to a projection-valued measure.
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the present paper. A parallel discussion may be provided, however. Conceptual vari-
ables are used in making decisions. These variables may be inaccessible if they are so
comprehensive that no clear decision can be made. Then it may be a solution to focus
on simpler, accessible decision variables.
The relationship between my approach and QBism (see for instance [23, 26, 66] on
this) was briefly discussed in Secton 2. I also regard the Bayesian way of thinking as
useful, in particular when we talk about an ideal observer. But I look upon Bayesianism
as much wider than subjective Bayesianism; as mentioned above, ‘objective’ Bayesian-
ism based on a right invariant prior is useful, both in applications and when discussing
connections between different approaches to inference.
A QBist advocates subjective Bayesianism and considers hypothetical betting con-
structions to be a basis for making decisions. I rather regard ‘decision’ as a more
primitive concept. A decision can be based on desires, beliefs or knowledges in some
combinations, but we very often make decisions without having neither the time nor
the opportunity to think of a hypothetical betting situation. See also the discussion of
Quantum Decision Theory in [44-48].
When asking questions to nature, two kinds of decisions are important. First we
must decide how to focus before asking the question, and next, after an answer is
obtained, we must decide how to interpret the answer.
14 The epistemic interpretation
Consider a physical system, and an observator or a set communicating observators on
this system. The physical variables which can be measured in this setting are examples
of accessible conceptual variables, and are called e-variables in [1].
A maximally accessible variable θ a admits values uaj that are single eigenvalues of
the operator Aa, uniquely determined from θ a. Let |a; j〉 be the eigenvector associated
with this eigenvalue. Then |a; j〉 can be connected to the question ‘What is the value of
θ a?’ together with the sharp answer ‘θ a = uaj ’.
A general ket vector |v〉 ∈H is always an eigenvector of some operator associated
with a conceptual variable. It is natural to conjecture that this operator quite generally
can be selected in such a way that the accessible variable is maximally accessible.
Then |v〉 is in a natural way associated with a question-and-answer pair. It is of interest
that Höhn and Wever [43] recently derived quantum theory for sets of qubits from
such question-and-answer pairs; compare also the present derivation. Note that the
interpretation implied by such derivations is relevant for both the preparation phase
and the measurement phase of a physical system.
From a general point of view it may be considered of some value to have an epis-
temic interpretation which is not necessarily tied to a subjective Bayesian view as it
is given in QBism. Under an epistemic interpretation, one may also discuss various
“quantum paradoxes” like Schrödinger’s cat, Wigner’s friend and the two-slit experi-
ment.
Example 1. Schrödinger’s cat. The discussion of this example concerns the state
of the cat just before the sealed box is opened. Is it half dead and half alive?
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To an observer outside the box the answer is simply: “I do not know”. Any ac-
cessible variable connected to this observer does not contain any information about
the status of life of the cat. But on the other hand – an imagined observer inside the
box, wearing a gas mask, will of course know the answer. The interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics is epistemic, not ontological, and it is connected to the observer. Both
observers agree on the death status of the cat once the box is opened.
Example 2. Wigner’s friend. Was the state of the system only determined when
Wigner learned the result of the experiment, or was it determined at some previous
point?
My answer to this is that at each point in time a quantum state is connected to
Wigner’s friend as an observer and another to Wigner, depending on the knowledge
that they have at that time. The superposition given by formal quantum mechanics
corresponds to a ‘do not know’ epistemic state. The states of the two observers agree
once Wigner learns the result of the experiment.
Example 3. The two-slit experiment. This is an experiment where all real and
imagined observers communicate at each point of time, so there is always an objective
state.
Look first at the situation when we do not knowwhich slit the particle goes through.
This is a ‘do not know’ situation. Any statement to the effect that the particles some-
how pass through both slits is meaningless. The interference pattern can be explained
by the fact that the particles are (nearly) in an eigenstate in the component of momen-
tum in the direction perpendicular to the slits in the plane of the slits. If an observer
finds out which slit the particles goes through, the state changes into an eigenstate for
position in that direction. In either case the state is an epistemic state for each of the
communicating observers, real or imagined, and thus also likely to be an ontological
state.
15 Concluding remarks
The treatment of this paper is in no way complete. Some open problems include:
- Characterizing exactly when a set of quantum states is in one-to-one correspon-
dence with a set of question-and-answer pairs.
- Giving more concrete conditions under which the Born formula is applicable in
practice. This is particularly relevant in connection to cognitive modeling ([28, 29]).
- Developing an axiomatic basis in the spirit of quantum logic (see for instance
[68]).
Group theory and quantum mechanics are intimately connected, as discussed in
details in [36] for example. In this article it is shown that the familiar Hilbert space
formulation can be derived mathematically from a simple basis of groups acting on
conceptual variables. The consequences of this is further discussed in [1]. This discus-
sion also seems to provide a link to statistical inference, as indicated in this paper.
From the viewpoint of purely statistical inference the accessible variables θ dis-
cussed in this paper are parameters. In many statistical applications it is useful to have
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a group of actions G defined on the parameter space; see for instance the discussion in
[56]. In the present paper, the quantization of quantum mechanics is derived from the
following principle: all model reductions in some given model should be to an orbit (or
to a set of orbits) of the group G.
It is of some interest that the same criterion can be used to derive the statistical
model corresponding to the partial least squares algorithm in chemometrics [37], and
also to motivate the more general recently proposed envelope model [38].
This paper focuses on group symmetry in spaces of conceptual variables, partu-
cularly those referred to as parameters/e-variables in [1]. When data are present, in
statistical inference one often starts with a group G∗ on the data space (see for instance
[56]). Referring to the statistical model Pθ (X ∈ B) for Borel-sets B in the data-space,
the relationship is given by Pgθ (X ∈ B) = Pθ (X ∈ g∗B). This induces a group homo-
morphism from G∗ to G. In some cases, this is an isomorphism, and the same symbol
g is often used in the data space and the parameter space. However, this is not the
case when the data space is discrete and the parameter space is continuous, as when
the model is given by a binomial distribution or a Poisson distribution. This case is
studied in detail in [69]. In these cases, group-theoretical methods were first used to
construct the Poisson family and the binomial family, and the basic tool is coherent
states for certain groups (the Weyl-Heisenberg group in the Poisson case and the group
SU(2) in the binomial case). Finally, inference is studied by reversing the roles of data
and parameter. The result in both cases is equivalent to Bayesian inference with a uni-
form prior on the parameter, which may be a coincidence. Taking this and the present
paper as a point of departure, there seems to be a possibility to provide new ideas to
symmetry-based approaches to statistical inference. As an extension of [46], a large
class of probability distributions are shown to have connections to coherent states in
[70].
In the present paper, the first axioms of quantum theory are derived from reason-
able assumptions. As briefly stated in [1], one can perhaps expect after this that such
a relatively simple conceptual basis for quantum theory may facilitate a further discus-
sion regarding its relationship to relativity theory. One can regard physical variables as
conceptual variables, inaccessible inside black holes. However, such considerations go
far beyond the scopes of both [1] and the present paper.
Further aspects of the connection between quantum theory and statistical inference
theory are under investigation.
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